COMMENTS
OLD STANDARDS IN NEW CONTEXT: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF FCC REGULATION
The fact that the nature of broadcasting frequencies necessitates "regulation" to
prevent electrical interference ... does not by any stretch of the imagination warrant
interference with freedom of speech by supervising broadcasting programs.
-Justin Miller,for the NationalAssociation of Broadcasters
The Commission's licensing function cannot be discharged, therefore, merely by finding that there are no technological objections to the granting of a license.... [C]omparative considerations as to the services to be rendered have [always] governed the
application of the standard of "public interest, convenience, or necessity."
-Justice Frankfurter,for the United States Supreme Court2
It was thought, for a time, that the regulatory role of the Federal Communications Commission had reached well-defined limits acceptable to the broadcasters and beyond which the Commission would not attempt to expand. During the past decade, however, the Commission has extended the scope of its
authority, and the unique cooperation that once existed between this regulatory body and the industry it regulated has disappeared.
During this period the Commission has issued regulations relating to the contracts between stations and the networks; 3 the publicity to be given to the sale
of a station so as to assure a fair price and competitive bidding;4 the ownership
of stations by newspaper publishers;5 and, most decried by the broadcasting
industry, comprehensive program standards with which to evaluate the service
rendered by the broadcasters. 6 The Commission has claimed that its authority
I The Blue Book: An Analysis by Justin Miller, President, National Association of Broadcasters, at 12 (1947).
2 National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 3i9 U.S. i9o, 216 (i943).
3 FCC, Report on Chain Broadcasting (1941). The authority of the rules laid down in this
report were upheld by the Supreme Court in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,
319 U.S. 19o (1943), noted in 4r Mich. L. Rev. i95 (1943). Many of the periodicals thought
the Commission had gone too far: see Editorial, 216 Saturday Evening Post o0 (July x7,
1943).
4 Powel Crosley, Jr., ii F.C.C. 3 (,945). See White, The American Radio 169-72 (i947).
5Actually, no rules were ever laid down on ownership of stations by newspapers, although
an investigation was begun in 1941. 8 F.C.C. 589 (1941). In x944, a statement of policy was
issued by the Commission declaring that the factor of creating a monopoly would be taken
into account. FCC Order, Notice of Dismissal of Proceedings, 9 Fed. Reg. 702 (1944). See
White, The American Radio 158-59 (1947). A recent case denying a license to a newspaper
made no mention of the monopoly element, but only talked of the inexperience of the newspaper in the radio field. WBNX Broadcasting Co., 4 Pike & Fischer Radio Regulation 207
(r948). (The Pike & Fischer Radio Regulation service will hereinafter be cited as RR.)
6 'CC, Public Service Responsibility of Broadcast Licensees (1946), commonly known as
the Blue Book. The report has been the subject of a host of legal writings. Excellent discussions
can be found in notes in 47 Col. L. Rev. 1041 (947) and 57 Yale L.J. 275 (1947)-
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to undertake these extensive controls is derived from the provisions of the
Communications Act of 1934 which direct it to issue, renew or revoke broadcasting licenses on the basis of "public interest, convenience, or necessity."'
Persons acquainted with public utility legislation will recognize the familiar
"public interest, convenience, or necessity" clause. That this standard, incorporated into the 1934 Act, was borrowed from prior public utility legislation is
borne out by the history of the statute. 8 Whether this borrowing was a result of
deliberate identification of the Communications Commission with the earlier
utility commissions, or a reflection of a favored device of legislative draftsmanship is not wholly clear. But whatever the motive in the selection of this phrase,
one thing is clear-the "public interest, convenience, or necessity" clause has
been given a unique interpretation under the Communications Act for the very
reason that radio differs in many vital respects from the traditional public
utility.
Entry into the power and transportation industries has long required the
issuance by the appropriate regulatory commission of certificates of convenience
and necessity, consonant with the public interest. While the use of a discretionary standard is thus permitted, under most statutes the applicant has been required to demonstrate actual public convenience and necessity. 9 More signifi748 Stat. 1082, 1083, io85, io86, io89 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 303, 307(a),
309(a), 3 12(b), 319(a) (Supp., i949). Section 3o3 relates to the power and duties of the Commission; section 307(a) relates to the granting of licenses and allocation of facilities; sections
309(a) and 312(b) relate to the issuance, renewal or modification of licenses; section 319(a) relates to construction permits.
The first federal regulation of radio, the Radio Act of 1912, provided for licensing of
broadcasters under the direction of the Secretary of Commerce. 37 Stat. 302 (1912). However,
the Secretary, Herbert Hoover, was blocked in his attempts to use licensing discretion so as to
prevent interference with existing stations. Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 286 Fed. 1003
(App. D.C., 1923); United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F. 2d 614 (D.C. Ill., i926). Although these decisions were in accord with the opinion of the Attorney General at the time the
Act was passed, 29 Ops. Att'y Gen. 579 (1912), the result was to create complete disorder, with
at least two stations operating on every channel. White, The American Radio x28--3o (1947).
The Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1162-1174 (1927), was designed to end this chaos of "free
enterprise," and the discretionary standard of "public interest, convenience and necessity"
was established. The Radio Act was superseded by the Communications Act of 1934, under
which all the authority formerly in the Federal Radio Commission was vested in the newly
created Federal Communications Commission. 48 Stat. ioi,
1102 (i934), 47 U.S.C.A.
§§ 6or, 602 (Supp. 1949).
8Senator Dill, floor manager of the legislation, told his colleagues, "In this proposed law,
however, we have laid down a basic principle-namely, the principle of public interest, convenience, and necessity-which is the general legal phrase used regarding all public utilities
engaged in interstate commerce." 68 Cong. Rec. 3027 (z927). For an excellent history of the
phrase as used in state and federal public utility legislation, see Caldwell, The Standard of
Public Interest, Convenience or Necessity as Used in the Radio Act of 1927, i Air L. Rev.
295 (1930).
9See Public-Convenience Application of Atlanta & St. A.B. R. Co., 71 I.C.C. 784 (1922);
Yazoo & M.B.R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 17o La. 44r, 128 So. 39 (193o); Seaboard
Air-Line R. Co. v. Wells, 1oo Fla. 1631, 131 So. 777 (1931); Re Billings-Sheridan Bus Line,
P.U.R. 19 28B, 816 (1928). But see Wabash, C. &W. R. Co. v. Commerce Commission ex rel,

Jefferson S, W. R, Co., 309 Ill.

412, 141

N.E.

212 (1923).
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cantly, the term, "public interest," has not been interpreted as an equivalent to
the promotion of the general welfare."°

Contrary to early expectations" based upon experience with the public
utility legislation, the courts have never engaged in a process of defining this
discretionary standard as used in the Communications Act; nor have they
placed any serious limitation on it. Public interest, interpreted from case to
case, has more and more approached the concept of general welfare.12
A plausible explanation for the difference in the interpretation and application of this standard may result from the difference in the objectives sought in
the two types of legislation. Public utility legislation was designed to protect
consumers from unfair rates in fields where the tendency toward monopoly and
oligopoly was considered inherent. 3 A public authority was given control over
rates and services; in return, the utility operators were freed from the rigors of
competition and granted officially recognized monopoly positions.'4
At the time the Radio Act of 192715 was proposed, there was no indication
that Congress was designing legislation intended to cope with the same kind of
monopoly problems that were involved in the utility industries. Conspicuously
missing from the Act was the "grandfather" clause, which, used in the public
utility legislation, gave preference to operators already in the field. The clause
was an express concession to the economic interests of existing operators. Its
absence in the radio legislation suggests that Congress intended the Commission
to exercise its discretion in the licensing of broadcasters without regard to any
" The courts have not allowed the commissions to exercise authority under this standard
not directly related to consumer protection from monopolistic rates or practices. Compare N.Y.
Central Securities Co. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12 (1932), involving an interpretation of the
standard as used in Sections 5(2) and 2oa(2) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 41 Stat. 48o,
482,494 (1920), 4 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 5 (2), 20a(2) (1929). See Hall, State Control of Business through

Certificates of Convenience and Necessity 89-93 (1948).
It is significant to note that the concept of "public interest" in other contexts was primarily
challenged when used as a basis for regulation of an industry; cf. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113
(1876); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (19,34).
"1The Federal Radio Commission said in its Second Annual Report (1928) at 166, "To be
able to arrive at a precise definition of such a phrase which will foresee all eventualities is manifestly impossible. The phrase will have to be defined by the United States Supreme Court,
and this will probably be done by a gradual process of decisions on particular combinations
of facts."
"2Some of the cases pointed out that it was not an unlimited power. But the only restrictions that emerged were that the Commission could not act unconstitutionally, arbitrarily or
capriciously: WOKO, Inc. v. FCC, 153 F. 2d 623 (App. D.C., 1945), rev'd on other grounds,
329 U.S. 223 (1946). Compare Yankee Network v. FCC, 107 F. 2d 212 (App. D.C., x939).
13See Mosher and Crawford, Public Utility Regulation 93-io6 (1933).
14It is important to note that control over service was only taken to insure effective rate
regulation. Since there was to be no competition, the utility operator could frustrate rate regulation by cutting down on the quantity or quality of services offered, thus cutting his costs. If
the consumer was to be effectively protected against unfair rates, the regulation had to assure
a "dollar's worth for a dollar."

Is44 Stat. r162-1174

(1927).

See note 7, supra.
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vested economic interests. The greater solicitude shown utility operators points
up the hesitation with which Congress interfered in industries where there were
no physical limitations to prevent the operation of a free-market process. The
technological limitations on the number of radio frequencies available, however,
precluded even the theoretical existence of free entry into the radio field within
a given geographical area. Evidently Congress felt less restraint in regulating a
monopoly made necessary by technology than in recognizing a monopoly caused
6
by market imperfections.

The congressional disinclination to recognize or establish any vested economic interests in the radio industry is further evidenced by the provision of
the Act requiring every licensee to sign an express disavowal of any property
rights in the license issued him. 7 This provision did not apply to those broadcasters who had obtained licenses prior to the 1927 Act. Nevertheless, when the
Federal Radio Commission, in its efforts to clear up the congestion on the broadcast bands, refused to issue new licenses to these broadcasters, the courts
quashed the claim of an unconstitutional deprivation of property for all time.
There was nothing for the broadcasters to own of which they could be deprived,
said the courts.,'
Was the discretion vested in the Communications Commission so broad as to
represent an unconstitutional delegation of authority on the part of Congress? 9
In this regard, the public utility statutes served better than analogies. If Congress could delegate authority to regulate for economic reasons under the standard of public interest, convenience and necessity, certainly the same standard
might be used when the delegation was motivated by technological necessity. 2°
x6The Commission early decided that some protection would be given to the broadcasters
already in the field. In United States Broadcasting Corp., 2 F.C.C. 208, 236 (1935), the Commission said, "The abstract right of all persons to engage in the business of broadcasting is not
absolute, but exists only if their operation will serve public interest, convenience, and necessity. Although the law expressly negatives a vested right in any licensee ... the Federal Radio
Commission early in its administration enunciated the principle that true public interest requires that existing stations should not be deprived of broadcasting privileges unless sound
,reasons of public policy demand such action."
17 48 Stat. 1083 (1934), 47 U.S.C.A. § 304 (Supp., 1949).
19 White v. FRC, 29 F. 2d xi3 (D.C. Ill., 1928); United States v. American Bond & Mortgage Co., 3r F. 2d 448 (D.C. Ill., 1929), aff'd 52 F. 2d 318 (C.A. 7th, 1931), cert. den. 285 U.S.
538 (1932).
19 Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan (the Hot Oil cases), 293 U.S. 388 (935), is the leading case
in support of the doctrine that Congress cannot delegate legislative authority without setting
down standards for guidance of the delegatee. The doctrine itself has questionable vitality
today; cf. Currin v. Vallace, 3o6 U.S. 1 (1939); Fahey v. Malonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947). At
any event, the reasoning of the Hot Oil cases was never applied to the exercise of Commission
authority.
2" The 1927 Act provided that the Commission make a "fair and equitable allocation of
broadcasting facilities," 44 Stat. 1166 (1927), and in some early cases this provision was used
as one basis of the Commission's power to delete stations. FRC v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266 (1933). However, since there were always other considerations present
in addition to that of fair allocation, the more comprehensive public interest standard was
usually cited by the courts as the basis of Commission authority.
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The courts upheld this view."
Still another constitutional hurdle was to be met. The "product" of the radio industry was "speech." The cry of censorship, coupled with the free speech
provision of the First Amendment, was to plague the Commission again and
again. While this administrative body was given a very wide discretion as to
what the service should be, it was not given a carte blanche to ignore the First
Amendment. The Act specifically declared that the Commission was not to
have the power of censorship, or of interfering with the right of free speech.22
How it was possible to regulate in the public interest, convenience, and necessity without impinging on the force of the provision against censorship and the
First Amendment was a problem left to the Commission-and the courts.
The Commission early contended for the right to consider program content
in the issuance of licenses.23 In an early court test, the licensee's claim of censorship was briefly dismissed, the court saying,
There has been no attempt on the part of the Commission to subject any part of appellant's broadcasting matter to scrutiny prior to its release. In considering the question whether the public interest, convenience, or necessity will be served by a renewal
... the

Commission has merely ... [taken] note of appellant's past conduct, which is

not censorship.24
The fact that the broadcast material was considered inimical to the public
health no doubt accounted for the short shrift made of the claim of censorship.S
Even when the Commission chose one applicant over another on the basis of
better program service, the industry's complaints were not too loud. Somehow a
21National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943); Chicago Federation of
Labor v. FRC, 4z F. 2d 422 (App. D.C., 193o); City of New York v. FRC, 36 F. 2d 115 (App.
D.C., 1929); General Electric Co. v. FRC,3z F. 2d 63o (App. D.C., 1929); White v. FRC,
29 F. 2d 113 (D.C. Ill.,
1928).
48 Stat. io9 (i934), as amended, 47 U.S.C.A. § 326 (Supp., 1949).
23In 1928, the F-RC said: "The Commission believes it is entitled to consider program service rendered by the various applicants, to compare them, and to favor those which render the
best service." FRC, Annual Report to Congress (1928), at i6i. See Technical Radio Laboratory v. FRC, 36 F. 2d I1, 114 (App. D.C., 1929).
24 KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n, Inc. v. FRC, 47 F. 2d 670, 672 (App. D.C., 1931). The broadcaster had been prescribing treatment to listeners, the treatment urged being the use of patent
medicines manufactured by the broadcaster. In Trinity Methodist Church, South v. FRC,
62 F. 2d 85o (App. D.C., 1932), the broadcaster had used his station to emit vituperative attacks on the Catholic Church and on the local government. Again the court had little difficulty in dismissing the claim of a violation of free speech. This was only a reasonable exercise
of governmental control for the public good.
On the strength of these court tests, the Commission has declared other program categories
to be against public interest: Adelaide L. Carrell, 7 F.C.C. 219, 222 (1939) (astrological predictions); Scroggin & Co. Bank, I F.C.C. 194, 195 (1935) (advice on marriage); Bremer Broadcasting Co., 2 F.C.C. 79, 83 (1935) (advice on health).
2sIt is to be noted that even when the scope of authority broadened from that of traffic
policeman, the Commission was never limited by the doctrine of the Hot Oil cases, 29 3U.S. 388
(1935). The precedents of the public utility cases and the earlier radio cases settled the matter as far as the courts were concerned.
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selection had to be made, and if one applicant promised to do more for the public interest, convenience and necessity than another applicant, the former prob6
ably deserved the license.2
When the Commission actually began to hand down rules and proscriptions
for the broadcasters to follow on penalty of being denied renewal of their
licenses, the industry became aggressive .' The broadcasters contended that
the prime function of radio regulation was to prevent interference on the frequencies, and that under the guise of public interest, convenience and necessity, the Commission was causing interference-interference with free speech.21
Not all of the broadcasters' ire was directed at the Commission's supposed
interference with free speech. The Commission was beginning to use "public
interest" in the layman's sense. 9 Licenses were issued or denied not merely on
a comparison of the technical and financial abilities of the various applicants,
but upon a determination of whether the services of this particular broadcaster
would benefit the American people. The Commission had travelled far from its
original role of airwaves traffic policeman. Control over radio had become more
than regulation based on technological necessity; it had become regulation
of conduct, and the basis was but emerging.
In 1949, the Commission issued a report on editorializing by broadcasters,
which, although modifying the former ban on editorializing under the Mayflower3o doctrine, was hardly a complete relinquishment of the Commission's
control over radio editorials. Recently, a potential broadcaster found that the
Commission could deny him a license on the basis of his previous activities as a
newspaper publisher. A review in some detail of the Report on Editorializing3'
and the recent decision in Mansfield Journal Co. v.Federal Communications
26 Hearings pursuant to § 307(c) of S. 3285, 73d Cong. 2nd Sess., at A2 3 (1934), 48 Stat.
1083(c) (1934), as amended 47 U.S.C.A. 307(c) (1949).
27The flamboyant trade paper "Broadcasting" had this to say about one of the Commission's decisions: "Jot down July, 1946 A.D. (in the year of our Lord) as the day the F.C.C.
took jurisdiction over God." Broadcasting, p. 4 (July 29, 1946). See generally, Miller, op. cit.
supra, note x.
Louis G. CaldweU points up the change in reaction on the part of the broadcasters in his
article, Developments in Federal Regulation of Broadcasting, Variety Radio Directory 940-48
(i939-4o). The change in the Commission's approach is traced in Rosenberg, Program Content-A Criterion of Public Interest in F.C.C. Licensing, 2 Western Pol. Q. 375 (1949).
2'Broadcasting, p. 14 (Sept.22, 1947); Caldwell, F.C.C.-Comments on the Report of the
Staff of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Law, 8 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
749 (194o).
'9 The courts approved with significant expressions: National Broadcasting Co. v. United
States, 3r9 U.S. 190, 216 (1943) (the Commission has the burden of determining the composition of radio communications); Simmons v. FCC, i69 F.2d 670, 672 (App. D.C., 1948) (the
Commission must determine that programming is "tailored to the particular needs of the com-

munity").
30

Mayflower Broadcasting Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333 (194i).

31 FCC, Report on Editorializing by Licensees (i949). It is set out in full in i R.R.
(1949).
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Commissiojt32 can illustrate the current use and broad reach of the concept of

public interest, convenience and necessity.
I. THE REPORT ON EDITORIALIZING
Never had an uncontested dictum secured more complete compliance or
caused greater discontent than that of the now celebrated Mayflower case. In
1941, the Mayflower Broadcasting Corporation applied for a renewal of its
WAAB (Boston) license. The licensee had broadcast the editorial views of the
station's owners during the period preceding the application. The decision condemned such editorializing, saying,
A truly free radio cannot be used to advocate the causes of the licensee. It cannot be
used to support the candidacies of his friends. It cannot be devoted to the support of
principles he happens to regard most favorably. In brief, the broadcaster cannot be an
advocate.33

The condemnation was in strong tones, but the license was granted; the condemnation was dictum.
This particular kind of dictum, however, had all the force of well-settled
law as far as the licensees were concerned. This was dictum issued by a board
possessing the power to withhold broadcasting licenses, and during the eight
years of the Mayflower doctrine's existence, it was obeyed.34 Even when the
station owners began a full-dress attack on the doctrine's validity, they used as
their battleground the press and Congress, rather than seeking a direct court
test.3;
The extreme reluctance of the broadcasters to press for a court test may be
accounted for by more than a fear of action by the Commission. The ban on
editorializing in no way interfered with a station's ability to show a profit. On
the contrary, it left more time for commercial programs. 6 Further, those
licensees that were interested in putting forth a particular point of view on controversial matters were still able to select the commentators for commercial
37
programs.
32

i8o F. 2d

28

(App. D.C., x95o).

33Mayflower Broadcasting Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333, 340 (1941).
34 Broadcasting, p. 13 (Jan. 20, 1947). Obedience sometimes took unique shape: WGN, the
Chicago Tribune station, read Tribune editorials as part of the advertising for the newspaper.
3sSee Hearings before Subcommittee of Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
on S. 1333, 8oth Cong. ist Sess., at iii, 126 (i947); N.Y. Times, p. 54, col. 7 (Apr. 20, 1948).
The attack on the editorializing ban was supported by many newspaper columnists: see Lawrence, "Questions of Editorial Opinions on Radio," N.Y. Sun, p. 29, col. i (Mar. 3, 1948).
But see 12o New Republic 28 (June 20, 1949).
36 White, The American Radio 177 (I947).

37Variety, pp. 26, 30 (July 25, 1945); Stewart, Radio Commentators and Free Speech, 14
Common Sense 32 (Aug., x945). Charles Siepmann suggests that the modification of the Mayflower doctrine may be a good thing since it will bring out into the open opinions now smoked
under by the use of commentators. Siepmann, Shall Radio Take Sides? i66 Nation '21o (Feb.
21, 1948). The Report on Editorializing did not specifically encompass the commentator prob-

lem: see text infra, at 87.
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Much more difficult to explain is the motivation of the Commission in enunciating the ban on editorializing. In The American Radio, Llewellyn White suggests:
Some of them [the Commissioners] sincerely believed with the people in government
that, inasmuch as the media of mass communication seemed to be falling into the
hands of fewer and fewer men and inasmuch as these few, for natural economic reasons,
seemed to be drawing farther away from the masses they served on fundamental public
issues, they might better withdraw from the field of advocacy altogether and make the
facilities available to all shades of opinion.3S
Whether or not these motives were clearly in the minds of the majority of the
Commissioners, it is evident that the Commission was no longer satisfied to act
merely as a traffic policeman.
It was the consensus of those who approved of the ban on editorializing that
since the Commission was required to select from among many applicants, an
obligation arose to see that radio did not become a mouthpiece for particular
economic, social or moral philosophies.39 Democratic theory would require that
licenses be granted either in equal ratios to men of varied philosophies, or
granted only on condition that no man use his license to expound only his particular philosophy. Since the former would require a probe into personal ideologies, the latter course was a more feasible alternative.40
When the National Association of Broadcasters, under the militant leadership of Justin Miller,4' began its all-out fight against the extended powers of the
Commission, the Mayflower doctrine seemed a perfect rallying point. Serious
doubts had been entertained by others than the station owners as to the propriety of the ban.2 When the NAB petitioned for a hearing on the Mayflower
3
doctrine, the Commission acceded.4 On June 8, 1949, the Report on Editorializing was handed down. One exuberant observer called this "the greatest single
39

White, The American Radio 177 (1947).

39Heffron, Free Air or Hot Air, So Commonweal 334 (July IS, i949); American Civil
Liberties Union, Should Radio Have an Editorial Policy? (1948); i2o New Republic 27 (June
20, 1949). The broadcasters, at least on the record, did not approve, according to a survey.
N.Y. Times, Section 2, p. ii, col. 4 (Dec. 28, 1947).
4oIt was further argued that it would be almost impossible to find licensees of varied philosophies, since radio had become big business. The Commission estimates that $r33,ooo is
the average initial outlay necessary for a regional station in a city over 5o,ooo population.
More important, profits from broadcasting had become tremendous. Blue Book, at 49. Thus,
ran the argument, there had to be safeguards preventing the one and only economic class represented in radio from foisting all their ideas upon the radio audiences. See text infra, at 9i.
4r See White, The American Radio 84-85 (1947).
42Siepmann, Shall Radio Take Sides?, 166 Nation 21o (Feb. 21, 1948); Heffron, Should
Radio be as Free as the Press? 47 Commonweal 466 (Feb. 20, 1948).
43 The hearings were ordered "i) To determine whether the expression of editorial opinions
by ...licensees... is consistent with their obligations to operate their stations in the public
interest. 2) To determine the relationship between any such editorial expression and the affirmative obligation of the licensees to insure that a fair and equal presentation of all sides of controversial issues is made over their facilities." FCC, Report on Editorializing, at i (r949).
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victory in behalf of freedom of expression... since... the editorial freedom
of newspapers [was confirmedl."44
Licensees could editorialize, but the Commission was not ready to surrender
the field completely to the broadcasters. The right of the public to be informed
is the "foundation stone of the American system of broadcasting,"45 and the
broadcasters' adherence to this precept was to be judged in terms of "overall
fairness."46
The fact that the broadcaster possessed great economic resources was no
justification for preventing him from editorializing. The private advocate might
possess these same advantages.47 Station owners who advocate their private
views may still meet the requirement of "overall fairness," for,
The duty to operate in the public interest is no esoteric mystery, but is essentially a
guided by a reasonduty to operate a radio station with good judgment and good faith
8
able regard for the interests of the community to be served.4
The Commission had a frank answer to the complaint that this standard of
"fairness" would violate the First Amendment:
Any regulation of radio, especially a system of limited licenses, is in a real sense an
abridgement of the inherent freedom of persons to express themselves by means of
radio communication. It is, however, a necessary and constitutional abridgement in
order to prevent chaotic interference from destroying... this medium.... The

most significant meaning of freedom of the radio is the right of the American people
to listen.., free from any governmental dictation as to what they can or cannot hear
and free alike from similar restraints by private licensees.49
44 Statement

by Justin Miller, 53 Time, No. 24, p. 53 (June 13, 1949).
Report on Editorializing, at 2 (1949).
46 The Commission cited as precedent its decision in United Broadcasting Co., io F.C.C.
5r5 (1945). The case arose when the United Auto Workers protested that station WHKC of
Columbus, Ohio, owned by United Broadcasting Co., had refused to sell them time on many
occasions and had unfairly censored scripts when the union was allowed to broadcast. The
licensee and the union later came to terms, and the reported case granted a joint motion that
the Commission adopt the agreed-upon statement of policy and dismiss the proceedings.
Shortly after this case the NAB dropped from its Code the provision recommending that no
broadcaster sell time for the presentation of controversial issues.
47 Compare Heffron, Free Air or Hot Air, 50 Commonweal 334 (July 15, 1949).
41 FCC, Report on Editorializing, at 7 (1949). The quotation is taken from the decision in
Northern Corp. (WMEX), 4 R.R. 333, 339 (1948).
49 FCC, Report on Editorializing, at 8 (1949). The Commission quoted at length from the
decision in Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. r (x945), where Justice Black said, at
20: "It would be strange indeed, however, if the grave concern for freedom of the press which
prompted adoption of the First Amendment should be read as a command that the government
was without power to protect that freedom.... Freedom of the press from governmental interference under the First Amendment does not sanction repression of that freedom by private
interests." Compare Associated Press v. NLRB, 3oi U.S. o3 (1937).
The Commission hastened to recognize that radio is within the First Amendment, as determined (in a dictum) in United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 66 (1948).
4sFCC,
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Although the question of "commentator regulation" was not specifically

covered in the report, it seems to fall within the "fairness" test.50 Nothing said
in the report will prevent the Commission from considering the character of
sponsored news commentaries in future licensing proceedings. If it is found
that a licensee has allowed or encouraged commentaries without regard to the
"right of the public to be informed," renewal can be denied.5'
Reaction to this modification of the Mayflower doctrine was favorable.s2
The Commission had lifted a ban that was too easily analogized to a government ban on newspaper editorials. The standard of "overall fairness" indicated
that the concept of public interest had lost none of its former vitality. If the
broad test of "fairness" is administered conscientiously, it will permit the Commission to promote fair discussion of controversial issues without leading to
government determination of the content of such discussionS3
Most important, the Commission seems finally to have faced the spectre
of the First Amendment and held its ground. The report candidly recognizes that
radio is neither a railroad nor a newspaper, that freedom of speech can best be
protected in radio by effective government controls, and that these controls
are but a means by which to secure a more effective freedom.54
so If there is to be no requirement that the station provide for fairness as to its sponsored
commentator programs, the whole Mayflower controversy would seem to be a tempest in a
teapot. It is much too easy for the biased licensee to avoid any risk of being charged with unfairness simply by choosing a commentator who "thinks right." See Stewart, Radio Commentators and Free Speech, 14 Common Sense 32 (Aug., 1945).
s' Commissioner Jones, dissenting, criticized the majority for "disregarding" the commentator problem. He urged definite standards to cover licensees and commentators. Missing,
however, was any enumeration of these standards. Query as to whether any such enumeration
could be made which would not be censorship. See text infra, at 9i.
S2 53 Time, No. 24, p. 53 (June 13, 1949); 33 Newsweek, No. 24, p. 5i (June 13, 1949);
Heffron, Free Air or Hot Air, so Commonweal 334 (July 15,1949); 27 U.S. News, No. 1o, p. 22
(Sept. 2, 1949). But see 12o New Republic 27 (June 20, 1949).

"3A note in 35 Cornell L.Q. 574 (i95o) urges that the Administrative Procedure Act, 6o
Stat. 238 (1946), 5 U.S.C.A. § ioo2 (a) (3) (Supp., 1949), requires the setting up of standards.
The note further argues that the denial of renewal based on "unfair" editorializing on the part
of the licensee is similar to ex post facto legislation unless such standards are set up. But as in
Commissioner Jones' dissent (note 5r, supra), there is conspicuously absent any determination
of what those standards should be, as well as any discussion of how such standards would be
effective without comprising detailed government control over what can be said over the
airwaves.
The Commission applied the "fairness" test in a reprimand delivered to station WLIB, New
York City. The station had broadcast a series of programs advocating a national Fair Employment Practices Commission, without soliciting other views on the subject. In a letter made
public by the Commission the station was told that it must "seek out, and encourage the
broadcast of opposing views." Chicago Tribune, p. i8, col. 4 (April 14, 195o).
S4The analogy to the action of the Department of Justice in Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. i (1945), would seem sound. Furthermore, since it is the government that determines who is to operate a radio station, the duty to protect free speech actually goes far beyond the duty inferred from the Sherman Act as regards newspapers.
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II. THE MANSFIELD JOURNAL CASE
Under Section 31 of the Communications Act, the Commission is to refuse
a license to any person who "has been finally adjudged guilty by a Federal
court of unlawfully monopolizing or attempting unlawfully to monopolize,
radio communications ... or to have been using unfair methods of competition."'5 Section 313 gives courts authority to revoke licenses of radio broad6
casters upon their being found guilty of antitrust violations in regard to radio.S
No other provision of the Act relates to monopoly in express terms. By normal
rules of statutory interpretation, the Commission would seem to be precluded
from denying a license to one engaged in monopolistic practices unless he had
been convicted, and then only if the conviction was for activities in radio communications.S7 The Commission, however, has not felt itself so limited, and its
authority in this respect was affirmed in the Mansfield Journalcase.
The Mansfield Journal Company had applied for AM and FM licenses,
both of which were denied by the Commission on the basis of the applicant's
previous activities as the sole newspaper in the town of Mansfield, Ohio.Ss
These activities included coercion of advertisers to prevent them from using
the existing radio station, WMAN, refusal to carry the program log of the radio
station, and refusing to print any save unfavorable comments about the station.
Since WMAN was the only other medium of mass communication in the town,
the Commission concluded that the applicant's conduct was for the purpose of
securing a monopoly of mass advertising and news dissemination. Under these
circumstances, the Commission determined that a grant of a broadcasting license would be inconsistent with the public interest. The Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia saw no usurpation of authority by the Commission
and affirmed the administrative body's decision.
In regard to the Commission's authority to deal with problems of radio
monopoly without prior antitrust convictions, the court had clear precedent.
The Networks9 case, testing the validity of the Commission's chain broadcasting regulations, had gone much farther than the facts of the case required in
upholding the regulatory body's authority to prevent monopolization of the
radio field, Justice Frankfurter declaring for the Court,
Nothing in the provisions or history of the Act lends support to the inference that the
Commission was denied the power to refuse a license to a station not operating in the
"public interest" merely because its misconduct happened to be an unconvicted vio6°
lation of the anti-trust laws.
ss 48 Stat. io86 (1934), 47 U.S.C.A. § 311 (Supp., '949).
s6 48 Stat. 1087 (1934), 47 U.S.C.A. § 313 (Supp., i949).
S7Compare Continental Casualty Co. v. United States, 314 U.S. 527 (1942).
58Fostoria Broadcasting Co., 3 R.R. 2014a (1948).
59 National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).

6oIbid., at 223.
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But the Mansfield journal had engaged in monopolistic practices as a newspaper
and not as a broadcasting licensee; hence the questionof monopoly within the
radio field was not really involved. In fact, the applicant's actions were intended to bring about not radio monopoly, but no radio at all; he sought to attain a monopoly of Mansfield's advertising, by running Station WMAN out
of business.6, The court of appeals seemed unaware that it was going beyond the
broad dicta of the Networks case when it announced:
The fact that a policy against monopoly has been made the subject of criminal sanction
by Congress as to certain activities does not preclude an administrative agency
charged with furthering the public interest from holding the general policy of Congress
to be applicable to questions arising in the proper discharge of its duties. ... Monopoly
in the mass communication of news and advertising is contrary to the public interest,
even if not in terms proscribed by the antitrust laws.62
Only in passing did the court point out that the character of the applicant is
specifically a relevant consideration under the terms of the Act.63 This consideration in itself would seem to allow the Commission to deny licenses to applicants
engaging in unfair business practices. That the Commission and the court preferred to rest their decisions on the broader test of public interest suggests that
the goal is not only to forestall monopoly in radio, but also to give the Commission discretion to prevent or discourage monopoly in the other agencies of
mass communication. 64 This view is further indicated by a Commission state61 There is no finding by either the Commission or the court that applicant was even considering applying for a radio license at the time he engaged in his monopolistic conduct. Consequently, the relation of his conduct to radio is hardly more than incidental.
62 i8o F. 2d 28, 33 (App. D.C., i95o).
63Section 3 o8(b) of the Act, 48 Stat. 1084 (1934), 47 U.S.C.A. § 3o8(b) (Supp., 1949) declares that the Commission may investigate the "citizenship, character, and financial, technical
and other qualifications of the applicant to operate the station." In Mester v. United States,
7o F. Supp. .18 (N.Y., 1947), the court upheld the Commission's action in refusing to approve
a transfer of a license which would give the appellant majority ownership of the station. The
appellant had had many difficulties with government agencies as to weight shortages, O.P.A.
violations and misleading labeling, from which the Commission deduced that appellant did not
possess a sense of public responsibility necessary to operate a radio station in the public interest. But see Hugh 0. Jones, iI F.C.C. 1138 (1947), in which the Commission granted a
license to applicant who had disregarded local liquor and gambling laws for an extended period
of time.
64 The decision could have been based on any of three grounds:
a. Since the Mansfield journal was the only newspaper in town, and since it had attempted
to acquire an advertising monopoly, the grant of a radio license would enhance the possibilities
of achieving such a monopoly, perhaps even to the extent of driving WMAN out of business
entirely. However, the thrust of the decision does not indicate such a basis, no mention being
made of the effect a new station would have on WMAN. It has not been a consistent policy of
the Commission to consider the economic effect on existing licensees in their grant of licenses

to new broadcasters. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940). But see FCC,

An Economic Study of Standard Broadcasting (1947).
b. Since appellant had engaged in monopolistic conduct before, it was probable that he
would do it again, a variation of the "bad man" theory. If this were the basis, it would seem
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ment to the effect that monopolistic conduct by the motion picture studios, even
though occurring wholly within the motion picture field, would be an important
factor in determining the studios' qualifications as broadcasting licensees.s
When this statement is compared with a recent Commission decision granting a
license to an applicant known to be violating the local liquor and gambling
laws,6 it becomes evident that the Commission is interested not in serving as a
general law-enforcement agency, but rather as an influence in the promotion
of full freedom in all media of mass communication.
The result in the Mansfield Journal case seems sound, despite the reliance
placed on the classification of the applicant's conduct as monopolistic. Irrespective of whether the Mansfield Journal had engaged in any activities in violation
of the antitrust laws, the past conduct of the applicant and the potential evil
of concentrating further control over communications into the hands of the
applicant afforded a substantial basis for determining that the public interest
would not be served by the grant of a license.
III. THE UNIQUE PosmION oF THE COMIISSlON
Recounting the expansion of the standard of public interest is much easier
than accounting for it, since neither the courts nor the Commission have ever
discussed the unique regulatory position of this administrative body. Radio
regulation, aimed at preventing technological interference, necessarily brought
about a limitation of entry into the field. Radio is not as free as the press, and
to say that it should be is either to ignore the limitation on the availability of
frequencies or to suggest a return to the chaos existing prior to 1927.
The Commission cannot confine its activities solely to prevention of technological interference any more than the utility commissions can restrict their authority to rate regulation. 7 Restriction on entry into the radio field secures the
station owner against new competition. Consequently, the broadcaster's incentive to improve and increase the service rendered is largely confined to the
fear of losing revenue to the other existing stations. In towns where only one or
that the authority of the Commission to consider character would have come in for more discussion than it did. Compare Mester v. United States, 7o F. Supp. 118 (N.Y., 1947).
c. The Commission is the only regulatory body concerned with communications, and it
should do all in its power to see that monopoly does not exist in any form of communications,
whether that form is normally under the control of the Commission or not. In addition to the
language quoted in the text, the court gave further indications that this was the rationale by its
citation of Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB,316 U.S. 3r (1942), in which the Supreme Court
decided that the Board was powerless to order reemployment of sailors who had been accused
of mutiny by their employers. Although no mutiny charges had been brought under the mutiny
statute, the Supreme Court declared that the Board was not "commissioned to effectuate the
policies of the Labor Relations Act so single-mindedly that it may wholly ignore other and
equally important Congressional objectives" (p. 47).
6sReply by Commission to Questions of Senate Interstate Commerce Committee, i RR
9 H: (r949).
0
e
F
66 Hugh 0..]Jones, i i F.C.C. 1138 (r947).
67 Note 14, supra.
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two stations are licensed, the licensee's incentive can be almost nonexistent. It
thus becomes the Commission's duty to promote the quality of service normally
produced by competition; the Commission must construct the standard of public interest as a substitute for the "public interest" which automatically asserts
itself in the "free market." 68
As indicated, the similarity of radio to the public utility is limited. A rough
railroad ride or a high electric bill can be independently judged as such by the
public; to some extent, a barometer is provided as to what regulation is necessary. But a broadcaster who slants the news can determine how the people shall
judge, and a broadcaster who fosters racial prejudice can entrench the American
dilemma. 69 Consequently, the determination of what regulation is necessary to
promote freedom of radio may often require a judgment as to what the public
values should be, rather than what they are.
Most important, the "product" of radio is speech, and it is the dilemma of the
Commission to enforce freedom of speech without becoming a government
censor. Under such circumstances, there can be no well defined standards. From
case to case, from situation to situation, the regulatory body must determine
how the public interest can best be served. Since the "product" is speech, the
fact that radio is largely controlled by a single economic class, which shares identical or similar economic and political philosophies, can assume a relevance not
present in public utility regulation.7° Effective radio regulation requires listener
protection from ideas and ideals foisted upon them without opportunity to hear
"the other side."
If the Commission is to use value judgments in determining who is to broadcast and what are to be the standards of programming, an open expression of
these policies is essential to prevent perversion of this potentially dangerous
control. Further, a frank recognition of the extent of this control and the basis
for its existence can forestall broadcaster attacks on the Commission's authority. The report revising the Mayflower doctrine is commendable in this
respect. The possibility of "government" radio is considerably lessened and
6SSome broadcasters have claimed that the only restriction on the availability of station
frequencies is the one the government "decrees." At the beginning of ig5o there were
2,835 AM and FM stations on the air, with 358 applications pending before the Commission.
Broadcasting, p. 88 (Feb. 13, ig5o). There is no reliable estimate of how many additional stations can be accommodated now or in the near future. The fact remains that a brief perusal of
any volume of the Commission Reports clearly indicates that there are more applicants than
there are stations, and that it is the Commission that decides which of the applicants will get
the license.
69 The Commission is now investigating charges that G. A. Richards, owner of stations in
Los Angeles, Detroit and Cleveland, instructed his newscasters to slant the news and inject
racial and religious bias into their newscasts. Evidence proves that, at Richards' order, a newscaster implied that Mrs. Roosevelt's automobile accident in 1945 was caused by her drunkenness. There is little question that many people believed this report.
7 See Llewellyn White's statement quoted in text supra, at 85. The cost of setting up a
radio station (Note 40 supra) is some substantiation of the claim that radio stations are controlled by one economic class, unrepresentative of the listening public.
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that of radio becoming an even more effective means of mass communication is
considerably enhanced if the Commission is conscious and open about the
authority exercised.7x
The standard of public interest, convenience and necessity gives the Commission the discretion necessary to carry out its obligations. Its use provides
the conceptual frame for regulation required by the concomitant factors of
technological limitations on the number of stations and the desire to prevent
one-sided control over an important means of mass communication.
ANCIENT RULES AND MODERN TRUSTS
I
of
the
ability of future generations to preserve
Motivated by a deep distrust
property interests, testators frequently attempt to retain control of their wealth
and to project their authority over its use and distribution far beyond the
grave.' Not only does the law furnish elaborate devices by which such control
may be carried out, but the possibility of large tax savings provides a strong
additional incentive for the creation of multiple generation gifts.2 The number
of successive estates which may be set up is limited by the rule against perpetuities. However, since future interests are now invariably created by the use
of trusts,3 the restraints on land at which this rule was originally directed are
71Advocates of government-controlled radio in Great Britain point with scorn at the
American system whereby private advertisers set the standards of radio content. In his recent
book, British Broadcasting (ig5o), R. H. Coase quotes one supporter of the British system as
saying (at 133), "It is one of the many advantages of the public ownership and control of the
radio that certain standards have been maintained. We have kept out the advertiser of pills
and corn-plasters and suchlike who holds the American radio in the hollow of his hand ....I
xThe ability to control property after death has been referred to as "the greatest latitude
ever given in the history of the world to the volition and caprice of the individual." Maine,
Village Communities 42 (i889). For a comprehensive outline of the economic and psychological
motives for which donors "transmute their voliti6n into dead hand restraints" and of the
general community objectives in policing such restraints, consult McDougal and Haber,
Property, Wealth, Land 246-49 (1948). The various legal devices by which these restrictions
may be carried out are discussed in Scott, Control of Property By the Dead, 65 U. of Pa. L.
Rev. 527, 632 (1917).
2 See text infra p. ioi.
3As the basis of wealth shifted from land to intangible property interests, the possibilities
of dissipation and mismanagement of family holdings increased, and the use of the trust as a
device for the transmission of wealth from generation to generation eventually became almost
universal.
The English Property Act of 1925 made all future interests equitable interests. Now the
only legal freehold estate in English law is the fee simple absolute in possession. If a series of
future interests is created, the legal fee simple title vests in the life tenant in possession in trust
for all subsequent beneficial owners. Cheshire, Modern Real Property 470-71 (6th ed. T949).
In Illinois, where it is necessary for the conservation, preservation, or protection of real
estate subject to legal future interests, a remainderman may petition a court of equity to
appoint a trustee with authority to sell, mortgage, or lease the property or to take any other
measures necessary for its preservation. Ill. Rev. Stat. (Bar ed. 1948) c. 22, -§ 50.

